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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Statistics compiled by the American Electronics Association—a leading defender of high tech's 
"union-free environment'—indicate the difficulty unions have had organizing electronics workers. The AEA 
surveyed almost 1,200 firms about union activity in their plants between 1971 and 1982. They reported 
fewer than 100 NLRB representation elections during that period, with unions winning only 21. 
These figures understate labor's problem. Through a sophisticated mixture of paternalism and repression, 
the high tech industry has prevented the vast majority of employee organizing efforts from reaching the 
stage of a Labor Board election. As a result, the AEA's 1900 member companies have only 90 union 
contracts. 
In this article, we will examine the job problems facing high tech workers, the factors inhibiting union 
organizing in their industry, the experiences of some recent high tech campaigns, and strategies for 
overcoming the obstacles to worker self-organization in this crucial sector of the U.S. economy. 
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Unions & Their Future 
• Steve Early & Rand Wilson 
On a cold, dark morning last winter, a union organizer we know 
was distributing leaflets outside a semi-conductor plant in 
Lawrence, Massachusetts. Like many non-union high technology 
manufacturing operations in the Merrimack Valley, this facility 
is located in an old textile mill. Seventy-five years ago, thousands 
of Lawrence mill workers waged one of the most militant strikes 
ever conducted by American workers. Now, when local high-tech 
workers call union organizers to complain about factory 
conditions, most are unwilling to identify themselves because they 
fear employer reprisals. 
Our friend was at the plant gate that morning in response to 
this kind of anonymous call. He expected the usual looks of 
apprehension from the older workers, and an occasional glimmer 
of enthusiasm among the younger ones. But on this day, the 
organizer's presence elicited no response at all. As the workers 
trudged through the plant gate, they accepted his handbills without 
comment, not even looking at him or the material they received. 
An exception was one middle-aged woman who took a leaflet, 
walked on a few steps before looking at it, and then suddenly 
• Steve Early and Rand Wilson are union organizers with experience in the high 
tech industry. 
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realized what it was. She turned and, with a genuine look of 
surprise on her face, asked, "You mean there are still unions?" 
Some might find this a strange question. But, in the world of 
the high tech worker, it's not an unreasonable one. It reveals much 
about how organized labor is viewed today by the 2.5 million 
unorganized workers employed by electronics companies around 
the country. Working for any of these firms—Digital, Wang, Texas 
Instruments, National Semiconductor, or the grandfather of them 
all, IBM—one could easily get the idea that unions, like the 
dinosaurs, have disappeared. 
Non-union high tech employers, from Boston's Route 128 to 
California's Silicon Valley, have been growing in size and 
importance while older manufacturing industries, with their 
heavily unionized blue-collar workforces, have declined. The 
country's major industrial unions have been unable to compensate 
for the resulting membership losses by organizing workers 
involved in the manufacture of micro-electronic components and 
finished products like word processors, computers, and other types 
of office and factory automation equipment.1 Even at unionized 
firms with long established bargaining units, unions have had little 
success expanding their membership to technical, computer and 
engineering personnel, sales and marketing employees, and other 
white-collar workers who represent an increasing percentage of 
the U.S. workforce. 
Statistics compiled by the American Electronics Association—a 
leading defender of high tech's "union-free environment'—indicate 
the difficulty unions have had organizing electronics workers. The 
AEA surveyed almost 1,200 firms about union activity in their 
plants between 1971 and 1982. They reported fewer than 100 
NLRB representation elections during that period, with unions 
winning only 21. 
These figures understate labor's problem. Through a 
sophisticated mixture of paternalism and repression, the high tech 
industry has prevented the vast majority of employee organizing 
efforts from reaching the stage of a Labor Board election. As a 
result, the AEA's 1900 member companies have only 90 union 
contracts.2 
In this article, we will examine the job problems facing high 
tech workers, the factors inhibiting union organizing in their 
industry, the experiences of some recent high tech campaigns, and 
strategies for overcoming the obstacles to worker self-organization 
in this crucial sector of the U.S. economy. 
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High Tech Myths vs. Reality 
Why have organizing efforts fared so poorly? According to 
management, unionization is unpopular because high tech 
workers enjoy a dazzling array of fringe benefits, flexible work 
schedules, attractive workplaces, job security, opportunities for 
advancement, and competitive wages and salaries. The industry's 
media hype has created the impression that everyone employed 
in high tech finds fulfillment in a Digital "Quality Circle," spends 
lunch hours soaking in a hot tub at Rolm, or goes golfing after 
work at the Wang Country Club. The reality is usually quite 
different.3 
While salaries, benefits, and personnel practices are more 
favorable for many highly-skilled technical and professional 
employees, most production workers in high tech have the same 
problems as unorganized workers in any other industry. Average 
hourly wages are $2 to $5 less than those of workers in comparable 
unionized jobs.4 
All personnel practices are established unilaterally by 
management. Employees have no job rights or meaningful role 
in determining their wages, hours or conditions of work. 
Promotions, layoffs, and recalls do not have to be based on 
seniority or any other agreed upon formula. 
Although many companies such as IBM, Digital, Control Data, 
and Texas Instruments have instituted grievance procedures, these 
almost never include provisions for worker representation or for 
resolution of problems, complaints, and discipline cases by a third 
party. Final authority rests with management. Experienced 
workers in non-union high tech plants often refer to these "open 
door" grievance mechanisms as an "out-the-door" procedure for 
workers who try to use them. 
Electronics industry production workers rarely advance to more 
highly skilled jobs because job training and tuition-reimbursement 
programs are seldom available to them. These programs are 
generally administered with the proviso that training or outside 
course work must enhance and/or be relevant to the currently held 
position, ruling out most unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The 
lack of training opportunities and the absence of fair promotion 
systems based on seniority reinforces the segregation of women 
and minorities in dead-end jobs.5 
Many high tech companies claim to have "no layoff" policies. 
During their boom years, they gained a reputation for stable 
employment that made them attractive despite their relatively low 
wages. But now these firms have been unable to sustain their 
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promises. During the most recent sales slump, workforces have 
been reduced dramatically. Since January 1985, over 8,000 high 
tech workers in Massachusetts alone have been permanently laid 
off and another 22,000 have lost income because of temporary 
furloughs. Over 10,000 high tech workers also lost their jobs in 
Silicon Valley last year. Thousands of others there are working 
short weeks.6 
Some companies like IBM utilize a substantial number of 
temporary production workers to avoid laying off their core 
workforce. Longtime Silicon Valley labor organizer Mike 
Eisenscher contends that the entire industry has been 
restructuring its workforce to create a pool of "temporary 
disposable workers." While no data exist on the exact number of 
temporary employees utilized in high tech, Eisenscher notes that 
"Santa Clara County now has one of the largest concentrations 
of temporary work agencies in the nation, as more and more 
companies turn to the employment of temps rather than 
permanent workers."7 It is standard practice for temps to be denied 
vacations, sick pay, health insurance and pension coverage. To 
become a permanent employee, they must survive two probation 
periods—one as a temp and another as a "new hire." Their job 
insecurity (and the ever-present dangling carrot of promotion to 
permanent status if they behave) makes most temps reluctant to 
engage in organizing activity. 
High tech has long claimed to provide safe jobs. But even this 
reputation has been tarnished as the industry's hazards have 
become harder to conceal. Integrated circuit and electronic 
component manufacturing expose workers to highly toxic solvents 
and gases. In Massachusetts, two high tech employees have 
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already been killed by arsine gas, 
a carcinogen whose use in chip 
production is rapidly expanding. 
In California, electronics workers 
have an occupational illness rate 
three times that of the average 
manufacturing worker.8 
High tech workers and the 
unions assisting them have found 
it hard to build successful 
unionization campaigns based on 
these health and safety hazards 
because anti-unionism and 
"union prevention" are built into 
s t ructure of personnel 
practices at most high tech firms. The industry employs an army 
of "personnel representatives" whose objective is to convince 
employees that their job conditions are better than those of other 
workers, and that solutions to any problems are best sought on 
an individual basis. Companies promote themselves not just as 
places to work, but as vehicles for personal growth and fulfillment. 
Employee participation schemes are common. In small group 
meetings attended by supervisors and representatives of top 
management or the company's "Human Resource" department, 
employees are encouraged to discuss work-related problems, ideas 
for improving production, and personnel practices. However, 
should anyone raise fundamental issues like determination of pay 
levels or procedures for promotions, they run the risk of being 
eliminated from future meetings or causing the group to be 
disbanded. In some instances, team or circle leaders use these 
discussions to identify pro-union members or other 
"troublemakers" and isolate them from co-workers.9 
The organization of production itself also isolates and divides 
workers from each other in high tech. As Mike Eisenscher notes, 
"Unlike auto factories, steel mills, and other basic manufacturing 
facilities, semiconductor and computer manufacturing plants 
generally do not have large numbers of employees performing 
functions on an integrated assembly line or manufacturing 
process."10 The work is done in small units, within departments 
ranging in size from only 6 to 30 workers. Jobs are also 
compartmentalized and closely supervised, with the ratio of 
supervisors to workers often running 1 to 5 or 10. Within 
individual plants, workers often have little contact with others 
outside their own small group. Plant size is kept small, and 
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products are manufactured in a cluster of separate plants that may 
be miles apart. 
Many companies require some employees to work for the 
standard 8-hour day, five days a week, while others work four 
10-hour days or three 12-hour shifts. Shifts are often staggered 
so that only a portion of the workforce comes and goes into the 
plant at any one time. Such arrangements and the use of 
temporary, part-time and "weekend-only" workers make it 
difficult for workers to maintain contact and to forge the unity 
necessary for a successful unionization campaign.11 
The last and most pervasive high tech myth is that paternalism, 
not repression, is responsible for the industry's union-free 
environment. However, even the most cursory examination of 
employer responses to union organizing in Silicon Valley confirms 
that high tech managers do not hesitate to harass, fire and blacklist 
large numbers of union supporters to disrupt organizing efforts. 
A chronological account of recruitment drives conducted by the 
United Electrical Workers (UE) between 1971 and 1984 involving 
workers at more than 10 Santa Clara County firms reveals that 
most UE activity never made it to the NLRB election stage because 
of intensive surveillance, threats, discriminatory discharges, and 
other illegal employer conduct.12 Other industrial unions in the 
Silicon Valley and on Massachusetts' Route 128 have had similar 
experiences. 
The Failure of Single-Plant Campaigns 
Organizing drives involving production workers in large high 
tech plants have been few and far between. In the early to 
mid-1970s, most campaigns by the UE and other unions in Silicon 
Valley that did go all the way to representation elections were in 
shops with 200 workers or less. Firms such as National 
Semiconductor, with much larger manufacturing workforces, were 
targeted for shopfloor campaigns as part of the UE's industry-wide 
Electronics Organizing Committee (which is described in the next 
section). But the UE's Silicon Valley recruitment efforts had a 
multi-employer, rather than a single-employer, focus and did not 
ultimately succeed or fail based on the response in any one 
workplace. 
The more traditional union approach of concentrating on only 
one potential bargaining unit has proven to be spectacularly 
unsuccessful in plants of 500 workers or more. The defeat of the 
Glaziers 1982-83 campaign at Atari in Silicon Valley and of CWA's 
drive during the same period at Wavetek in Indianapolis, illustrates 
why. And a short-lived AFL-( 
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why. And a short-lived AFL-CIO coordinated campaign directed 
at high tech companies in Massachusetts likewise demonstrates 
the limitations of "new approaches" to achieving traditional 
objectives in the current climate. 
The tragically muddled and ill-timed Atari campaign began in 
"hot shop" fashion when some workers in the company's coin-
operated video games division reacted to wage cuts and rumors 
of lay-offs by visiting the nearest union they could find— Local 
1621 of the Glaziers, Architectural Metal, and Glass Workers. The 
outcome would probably not have been much different if a more 
experienced industrial union had been involved, if the latter had 
proceeded in the same fashion as the Glaziers did, but the Atari 
workers' rather random choice of a small craft union to assist them 
contributed to the resulting fiasco. 
Card-signing to secure a representation election began 
immediately, despite the fact that Local 1621 had no broad-based 
in-plant committee at Atari and little clarity about how many 
workers in a number of separate-but-related manufacturing 
facilities might have to be included in any proposed bargaining 
unit. To make matters worse, Atari was soon rocked by financial 
troubles and successive workforce reductions caused by its shifting 
of assembly operations overseas. Up to 2,500 jobs were eliminated, 
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including many within the scope of the union's organizing activity. 
The Glaziers' two initial attempts to file for an NLRB election were 
rejected by the Board on the grounds that an appropriate Atari 
bargaining unit contained hundreds more workers than the union 
thought and that the union had not met the minimum legal 
requirement of signing up 30% of them. 
By the time Local 1621 finally got an election, more than a year 
later, it involved fewer than 200 workers. This was only a small 
part of the workforce it had originally tried to organize. The 
survivors who voted—most of them company loyalists—were very 
hostile to the union. They rejected collective bargaining by 143 
to 29. The campaign ended in confusion about whether the 
attempt at unionization was a valid response to the job insecurity 
of Atari workers or was, instead, the reason for the company's 
decision to relocate its manufacturing operations to Asia! 
Embarrassed by the lopsided defeat, "a number of top AFL-CIO 
officials minimize[d] the significance of the Atari vote," according 
to a Washington Post report. They condemned the organizing effort 
as "ill-conceived, too little, too soon, and as one put it 'not typical 
of what we can achieve.'" 
A far more carefully planned and well executed high tech 
campaign by the Communications Workers of America (CWA) in 
Indianapolis during the same period employed atypical union 
organizing methods. But it still showed the limits of a single-plant 
approach against a determined, flexible and well-financed foe. 
CWA's campaign at Wavetek, a completely non-union company 
which manufactures electronic test and measurement equipment 
for other high tech firms, was jointly conducted by the union's 
national organizing department and a large telephone workers' 
local with a record of successful small shop organizing in the 
telecommunications industry. Wavetek's 1,000-worker plant was 
targeted after the union did considerable research to evaluate the 
company's financial situation, its investment plans, and whether 
or not it would be able to shift production elsewhere in response 
to union organizing and a strike for a first contract. At the same 
time, CWA organizers and local union members developed 
contacts inside the plant to find out more about conditions and 
assess whether there were sufficient job problems to fuel a 
successful campaign. 
The union's drive was based on the UE model of "strategic 
organizing," rather than a traditional "hot-shop" campaign.13 The 
plan was not simply to get an NLRB election. It was to build a 
strong in-plant committee, recruit and train rank-and-file 
leadership for it, organize around shopfloor issues, and delay card-
u ^»7&iLiM^»^11figi^S^^iMaiiaai 
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B election. It was to build a 
it and train rank-and-file 
pfloor issues, and delay card-
signing until majority support for unionization had been developed 
through mini-campaigns. In these issue-oriented shopfloor 
struggles, management would either be forced to make 
concessions in response to worker activity (thereby demonstrating 
the efficacy of collective action) or, by its refusal to act, would 
demonstrate the need for collective bargaining. 
CWA succeeded in carrying out its plan in the course of 18 
months of escalating conflict between union supporters and 
management. But Wavetek's anti-union campaign was waged with 
a force and intensity usually reserved by employers for the period 
immediately preceding an NLRB vote. Huge video screens were 
installed around the plant to broadcast regular anti-union 
messages, Big Brother style. A management-backed committee of 
anti-union employees was given free reign to intimidate and harass 
pro-union workers. (This group also picketed and vandalized the 
union's campaign office across the street from the plant). 
Supervisors distributed reams of anti-CWA propaganda, delivered 
captive audience speeches, held extensive one-on-one meetings 
with workers, and assisted the "No Committee" in publishing an 
anti-union newsletter to counter the union's own rank-and-file 
publication. 
In response to CWA-backed agitation, Wavetek instituted more 
than 25 specific changes or improvements in its personnel 
practices. What killed the union drive, however, was not kindness. 
It was three successive lay-offs of production workers which 
permanently reduced the plant's workforce by one-third, 
decimated the ranks of the CWA organizing committee, and 
reduced the number of card-signers from a near majority to less 
than 30%. As a CWA organizer later recounted: 
Each layoff resulted in mass transfers between departments, 
causing widespread fear and uncertainty. Departments that 
had a great deal of union support were eliminated. Anti-
union workers on the other hand, were promoted to new 
classifications to avoid laying them off. Management 
redesigned the plant, putting up dividers and moving aisles, 
to limit contact between the remaining union supporters and 
non-union workers. The best committee people left were put 
totally by themselves so they couldn't talk to anyone. 
While these moves created great havoc for CWA, they did not 
apparently have much impact on Wavetek's business. Its overall 
sales remained steady and the plant's output was maintained 
through rapid automation, subcontracting of work, and extensive 
overtime. In addition, the layoffs resulted in a major change in 
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the composition of the workforce. At the start of the campaign, 
there was a 3 to 1 ratio of assemblers to technicians. (The latter 
tended to have two-year degrees, white-collar pretensions, and 
little interest in the union.) After the layoffs, the ratio was IV2 to 1. 
CWAs support was thus fatally eroded among assemblers and 
it could only count on a small minority of technicians. The union 
decided to close its campaign office, gradually withdrew its two 
organizers, and left it to the local union to maintain contact with 
the fragile rank-and-file network that remained. Unlike the 
Glaziers at Atari, CWA believed it was better to acknowledge a 
setback in this manner than press ahead to certain defeat in an 
NLRB election. 
At both Atari and Wavetek, workers of a single employer were 
mobilized in isolation from any larger movement of high tech 
workers because no other such organizing activity was going on. 
As a result, they alone bore the full brunt of a concentrated 
management assault. The AFL-CIO's New England High Tech 
Organizing Campaign was an attempt to pool union resources, 
carefully select targets, coordinate organizing work and focus 
activity in the same geographical area so that several separate but 
simultaneous campaigns would mutually reinforce each other. 
To this end, five unions-CWA, IAM, UAW, IUE, and ACTWU-
established and jointly funded a committee of organizers chaired 
by AFL-CIO regional and national staff members. 
An economist was hired to produce detailed research on the high 
tech industry in Massachusetts and on many individual firms as 
the basis for the group's targetting decisions. An area north of 
Boston was selected where the participating unions already have 
a substantial concentration of members and where there is a large 
number of non-union high tech plants with 500 to 1,000 workers. 
After studying over 100 companies in the area, the organizers and 
staff targetted 13 firms. 
The committee then retained a professional pollster to determine 
employee attitudes towards unionization at these firms. A 
telephone survey of more than 300 workers was conducted. The 
survey explored attitudes towards management, views on unions, 
and specific job-related concerns. The results confirmed what 
some organizers already knew: organized labor was not well 
regarded. Among the production workers, 48% expressed a "low 
opinion" of labor unions, including 19% who had a "very low 
opinion." (Meanwhile, only 32% had a "high opinion" of unions 
and only 5% a "very high opinion.") An even larger number, 67%, 
did not believe they would be better off if they belonged to a union, 
compared to 28% who felt that they would be. Only 25% of those 
polled said they would vot< 
organize their firm. 
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polled said they would vote for a union if one attempted to 
organize their firm. 
Chastened by these results, the participating unions divided up 
the target firms in mid-1983. Thereafter, however, the organizers 
went about their work in traditional fashion. Each union was left 
to initiate its own individual in-plant contacts, committees and 
campaigns, but there were no area-wide or industry-wide 
programs aimed at workers in all the target firms. A few house 
calls were made, some small group meetings were held, and one 
union did further polling. But not a single campaign was launched. 
Unable to engage workers in traditional organizing activity 
directed toward representation elections, the participating unions 
were unwilling or unable to devise alternate strategies for 
developing in-plant contacts and leadership and helping high tech 
workers fight for job improvements short of a union contract. By 
the beginning of 1984, the committee of organizers was no longer 
meeting. 
Strategic and Industry-Wide Organizing Initiatives 
The odds against success in single-plant high tech campaigns 
conducted by unions individually or jointly have led some 
organizers to promote workplace activity and forms of 
organization which do not have a short-term election focus. The 
workers involved have been employed in Silicon Valley, the Boston 
area, and in the belly of "Big Blue" itself, IBM. This effort parallels 
the approach of clerical organizers in the "Working Women" or 
"9 to 5" movement around the country. The underlying 
assumption is that there are few workplaces where majority 
support for unionization can be developed at present. But there 
are many job problems that workers can be encouraged to organize 
around as part of a looser "pre-union" network. Collective 
struggles over such issues can be used to identify and train rank-
and-file leaders and to develop the group consciousness necessary 
to move on to formal unionization campaigns. 
The UE's decision in 1974 to create a Silicon Valley Electronics 
Organizing Committee (EOC) reflected this longer-term strategy. 
For most of the ten years of its existence, the EOC was assisted 
by only one full-time union staffer (who frequently had other 
duties). The major part of its activity was conducted by a dedicated 
network of rank-and-file volunteers who worked at large semi-
conductor firms like National Semiconductor, Intel, Fairchild and 
Signetics. The EOC operated with a small budget but a structure 
that included elected leaders, formal membership and nominal 
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Mike Eisenscher spent a decade trying to organize high tech workers in 
Silicon Valley for the United Electrical Workers (UE). Mike has produced 
many valuable reports and proposals based on his experience. See the 
notes at the end of this article, particularly Note # 7. 
dues. To protect its activists from management retaliation, the UE 
initially encouraged most workers involved to keep their 
membership secret. When thousands of copies of the EOC 
newsletter, The Union Voice, were distributed throughout the 
Valley, workers would hand them out at plants other than their 
own to avoid identification by their employers. 
Within firms like National Semiconductor, committee supporters 
were eventually able to surface in sufficient numbers to lead 
sometimes successful campaigns for cost-of-living raises, job 
security protection, improved safety and health conditions, and 
an end to racial discrimination in job assignments and promotions. 
They responded to management-initiated "Quality Circles" just 
like "colonizers" for industrial unions did in the 1930's; they tried 
to take them over to expose their limitations as vehicles for genuine 
worker participation and representation. To recruit Filipino and 
other immigrant workers, the committee worked closely with 
community organizations concerned about harassment by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service.14 
The UE's ability to sustain this level of activity was limited by 
scarce resources. When Mike Eisenscher, the organizer responsible 
for assisting the EOC, took a leave of absence in 1984, he was not 
replaced. Meanwhile, management repression took a heavy toll. 
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According to Eisenscher: "much of (the EOC's) leadership was 
fired between 1981 and 1983. The failure of the NLRB to provide 
any protection compelled some of the most committed leaders to 
seek work elsewhere and the operation of an industry 'blacklist' 
kept some from remaining in the industry at all. They ultimately 
had to seek jobs outside the industry and, in some cases, outside 
the Valley."15 
A joint effort by the UE and CWA to foster an industry-wide 
High Tech Workers Network (HTWN) in Massachusetts in 1982-84 
had a shorter life-span and encountered similar difficulties when 
the union organizers involved were laid off or reassigned. During 
its period of peak activity, the Network offered an alternative 
model to the dead-end approach of the multi-union AFL-CIO high 
tech campaign described earlier. Like the UE's EOC, the Network 
tried to help workers win job-related improvements regardless of 
whether there was enough support for collective bargaining in 
their workplace. 
Network supporters noted that while the AFL-CIO's opinion 
survey of Massachusetts high tech workers showed much anti-
union sentiment, more than 55% felt "that the only way employees 
can have enough clout with their company is by banding together 
as a group." The Network was projected as a non-union vehicle 
for group activity that would capitalize on employee discontent 
with performance reviews, merit pay systems, inadequate 
promotional opportunities, and limited access to job training 
programs. In practice, the Network served as a personal support 
group and newsletter production and distribution committee. Its 
workplace contacts and correspondents contributed lively reports 
on personnel practices and problems thoughout the industry to 
The High Tech Workers Monitor, which was circulated at firms 
like Digital, Wang, Honeywell, and smaller companies. But 
Network supporters remained too isolated and insecure about 
their jobs to organize and lead significant workplace activity. Even 
the act of handing out the Monitor could lead to summary 
dismissal as one Network stalwart discovered at two different 
companies. (The NLRB secured a back-pay settlement from both 
employers who fired her, but the damage to Network organizing 
had already been done, and reinstatement was not a viable option.) 
While both the EOC and the HTWN succeeded in bringing 
workers together from a number of high tech firms, no pre-union 
organization has been more persistent in networking within a 
single firm than the IBM Workers United (IBM WU), a nine-year-
old workers committee originating at the computer giant's main 
manufacturing plant in Endicott, N.Y. IBM is the most aggressive 
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and successful anti-union high tech firm in the world. In the U.S., 
none of its 200,000-plus employees are represented by a union, 
and even in heavily unionized Western European countries it has 
been able to minimize union membership. Amazingly enough, 
IBM WU has operated without outside union assistance. On its 
own, it has made contacts with workers in other plants (including 
some who belong to an organization of dissident black employees 
at IBM) and has sent representatives to international conferences 
involving IBM employee organizations abroad. 
In the 10,000-worker Endicott plant the group publishes an 
"underground" newsletter called The Resistor. Until recently, IBM 
WU leaders had to operate secretly, never revealing their identity 
in the plant or local community.16 Through The Resistor and with 
the help of community allies, they have waged on-going publicity 
campaigns against favoritism, unsafe job conditions, IBM's 
dumping of toxic wastes, the company's sale of computers to South 
Africa, and other timely issues. The survival of IBM WU is a 
testament to the patience, perseverance, courage and imagination 
of its leaders. But the group's small size and its understandable 
reluctance to be identified with any national union in the anti-
union environment in which it operates makes it a slender reed 
on which to base large-scale unionization campaigns at IBM or 
the rest of the high tech industry. 
The Community-Labor Alternative 
To many observers, the AFL-CIO Committee on the Evolution 
of Work's report, The Changing Situation of Workers and Their 
Unions, signaled a new commitment by the labor movement to 
develop alternative forms of union membership and new 
recruitment techniques that might be applicable to high tech. So 
far, however, there are few signs that either the traditional or non-
traditional organizing described in this article will receive more 
institutional backing than it has in the past. 
For understandable (but nevertheless shortsighted) reasons, 
America's industrial unions prefer to invest only in organizing 
campaigns that are quicker, easier to win, and able to produce 
dues-paying members in formal collective bargaining units.17 This, 
of course, usually requires forays into the public sector, 
competition with other AFL-CIO unions, and affiliation with or 
raids on independent employee organizations, instead of 
organizing the unorganized! No union—large or small, progressive 
or conservative, acting alone or in concert with others—has been 
willing or able to provide consistent support for efforts to organize 
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high tech targets that do not offer the prospect of immediate 
membership gains. 
As a result, organized labor has—for the time being—abandoned 
the field in high tech. And the hundreds of thousands of workers 
who toil in the often oppressive "union-free environment" of the 
industry are without even the minimal union-backed workplace 
committees and networks that once existed to nurture, publicize 
and coordinate labor resistance from within. 
Trying to fill this enormous vacuum, is a loose coalition drawn 
from community, peace, and environmental groups, local 
coalitions on occupational safety and health, independent research 
organizations, labor education programs, and union staffers. 
Organized at a national meeting in May 1985 and operating under 
the name Integrated Circuit, this alliance of high tech industry 
critics is continuing the fight for workers' rights, environmental 
protection, occupational safety and health, and increased 
corporate social responsibility. Integrated Circuit members are 
trying to link labor and community concerns in a growing number 
of places around the country—from the "older" centers of high 
tech development in California and Massachusetts to newer ones 
like North Carolina's "Research Triangle," Texas' "Silicon Prairie," 
Colorado's "Silicon Mountain," Oregon's "Silicon Forest," and 
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Michigan's "Automation Alley."18 
• In California, Integrated Circuit affiliates such as the Silicon 
Valley Toxics Coalition have mobilized public opposition to toxic 
waste dumping and environmental law violations by electronics 
firms. 
• The COSH groups in Santa Clara County and Massachusetts 
are keeping the pressure on government agencies responsible for 
enforcing health standards and exposure limits in firms utilizing 
the wide range of hazardous chemicals found in the industry. 
MassCOSH is doing education and outreach among unorganized 
high tech workers to inform them about provisions of the state's 
new "right to know" law. Santa Clara COSH has helped form an 
organization of disabled electronics workers, called the Chemically 
Disabled Workers Group, which is fighting for workers' 
compensation reform and creation of a workers' clinic in Silicon 
Valley to deal with the epidemic of job-related illnesses now being 
reported there. 
• Public interest research and advocacy groups like the Pacific 
Studies Center and the Massachusetts High Tech Research Group 
are challenging industry propaganda with reports on the negative 
impact of high tech lobbying against progressive taxation, 
protective labor legislation, and environmental regulation. 
• High Tech Professionals for Peace and the Center for Economic 
Conversion—two Integrated Circuit affiliates opposed to the 
nuclear arms race—are conducting education campaigns against 
the increased "militarization of high tech" caused by President 
Reagan's military build-up. 
• On the local level, in Lawrence, Massachusetts, the Lawrence 
Area Strategy For Employment Rights (LASER) is organizing union 
members, unorganized workers, community groups, churches and 
public officials to confront electronics companies over their 
minority hiring policies, plant closings and lay-offs, and abuse of 
government incentives for industrial development such as low-
interest loans, industrial revenue bonds and property tax breaks.19 
The network of individuals and organizations in Integrated 
Circuit is also united in the effort to "increase the commitment 
of labor to providing the funds, resources, staff and publicity to 
organizing efforts in high tech, leading to a major commitment 
for the organization of the entire industry"20 Integrated Circuit 
organizers argue that unions could begin providing this assistance 
on a low-cost basis in three crucial areas: 
1) Services to Non-Union High Tech Workers. The experience 
of the EOC and the HTWN demonstrate the importance of labor-
backed initiatives that can disseminate information, link workers 
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in different workplaces, provide them with legal advice and 
organizing training, and develop the rank-and-file leadership 
necessary for future organizing campaigns. A detailed proposal, 
developed by Mike Eisenscher, outlines how these functions could 
be performed once again in Silicon Valley by a new "Electronics 
Workers Organizing and Service Center" launched with modest 
union funding.21 Elsewhere, expanded use of sympathetic labor 
education programs, COSH groups, legal service programs, 
community-based immigrant rights organizations, and existing 
local unions would enable the labor movement to reach out to 
high tech workers on a more systematic basis and provide them 
with the support they need for individual and group struggles 
against their employers. If the "associate member" benefit 
programs recommended by the AFL-CIO's Evolution of Work 
Committee are actually implemented, high tech workers should 
be a primary market for them. 
2) Development of Community-Labor Coalitions Dealing with 
Local High Tech Industry Problems. Even without a base of 
dues-paying members in high tech, individual unions and central 
labor bodies could play a more active role in opposing the 
industry's political and economic dominance in many 
communities. Union members in other industries and the public 
sector, their families and fellow citizens are all adversely affected 
by industrial development strategies that favor high tech at the 
expense of state treasuries, local tax bases, the environment, and 
unorganized workers. The LASER model of a local watch-dog 
organization which stimulates discussion about such economic 
development and employment issues should be duplicated—with 
greater union involvement—in other communities. 
3) Confronting the High Tech Industry in Politics, Public 
Opinion, and the Legislative Arena. At the state level, high tech 
firms are increasingly influential opponents of union-sponsored 
legislation dealing with plant closings, right-to-know, VDT 
protection, workers' compensation, unemployment benefits, and 
other issues. In their very effective lobbying, industry 
representatives invariably purport to speak for everyone in high 
tech—owners, managers, and workers! The industry's economic 
and political outlook is reflected in the "new ideas" of the growing 
"neo-liberal" wing of the Democratic Party, which has benefited 
greatly from high tech campaign contributions (many of which 
also go to more conservative Democrats and Republicans). This 
"neo-liberal" tendency is increasingly identified with criticism and 
repudiation of the labor movement as the voice of organized and 
unorganized workers. It enthusiastically promotes the "flexible," 
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"competitive/' and supposedly "more productive" (i.e. union-free) 
environment of high tech. Organized labor's viability as an 
effective champion of the interests of its own members and 
unrepresented workers in high tech and other industries requires 
it to take a more active role in challenging the industry's political 
agenda. Labor's ability to organize credible challenges to 
management control in high tech workplaces would be greatly 
enhanced by any resulting changes in public consciousness about 
the industry's social role. 
Conclusion 
If the labor movement fails to undertake new initiatives of the 
sort outlined above, it does so at its own peril. Organizational 
in-roads in high tech will not be made spontaneously in the current 
environment. And waiting for further industry "shake-outs" or 
some larger economic crisis to create more favorable conditions 
does not facilitate the preparatory work that must be done now 
to enable unions to take advantage of new opportunities in the 
future. High tech's future will most certainly be as "union-free" 
as its past if education, agitation and organization are not resumed 
on a far wider scale. • 
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